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Abstract 
This article seeks to reassess the potential merits and weaknesses of 
the Subaltern Studies project through the prism of Vivek Chibber’s 
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and three anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on various drafts of this article. 
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much-publicised and controversial book Postcolonial Theory and the 
Specter of Capital. By critically examining Chibber’s work, the article 
aims to better pinpoint exactly what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ with the 
Subaltern Studies project, while drawing out some productive points of 
engagement between Marxism and postcolonial theory more 
generally. In particular, we argue that an understanding of the origins 
of capitalist modernity remains a relatively unexplored omission within 
postcolonial thought that problematises their broader project of 
‘provincialising Europe’. Against this backdrop, the article explores the 
affinities between Leon Trotsky’s notion of uneven and combined 
development and postcolonialism, demonstrating how the former can 
provide a theoretical solution to the problem of Eurocentrism that the 
Subaltern Studies project correctly identifies but inadequately 
conceptualises. 
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Vivek Chibber’s Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital1 has 
generated an unusual amount of attention for an academic work – 
particularly so for a text dealing with a number of complex and 
sometimes arcane theoretical issues.2 Chibber’s critique of Subaltern 
Studies – and postcolonialism more generally by his reasoning – has 
provoked a polarised and lively response from scholars working within 
a variety of disciplines (Political Economy, Cultural Studies, Sociology, 
International Relations, etc.) and different theoretical and political 
traditions. To some extent, this is not surprising. Postcolonial Theory 
is an intentionally provocative and polemical text which was bound to 
incite passionate responses, particularly from the subjects of Chibber’s 
critique and their most ardent detractors. And so it has. Those working 
within the Subaltern and postcolonial traditions – the two not being 
entirely identical3 – have responded in kind, from questioning the 
validity of Chibber’s interpretations of their and other colleagues’ 
work,4 to challenging the extent to which his critique of Subaltern 
Studies applies to postcolonial theory more generally,5 to cross-
examining Chibber’s own self-proclaimed Marxist credentials.6 In 
                                            
1 Chibber 2013.  
2 See, inter alia, Vanaik 2013; Chatterjee 2013; Levien 2013; Watson 2013; Murphet 2014; Brennan 
2014 [inserted into bibliography – MC]; Jani 2014; Ahmed 2014; Spivak 2014; Journal of World-
Systems Research 2014; Nilsen 2015; Lazarus 2016. 
3 For an illuminating discussion of the distinct intellectual lineages of postcolonialism and Subaltern 
Studies, see Lazarus 2016, pp. 93–5; Parry 2017. [no such entry in bibliography – MC] 
4 Cf. Chatterjee 2013; Seth 2014; Murphet 2014; Roy 2015.  
5 See especially Spivak 2014.  
6 Cf. Murphet 2014. 
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contrast, a number of Marxist commentaries on the book have hailed 
it as a blistering and systematic demolition of postcolonial theory’s 
pseudo-radical, anti-universalist strand of postmodernist-influenced 
obscurantism.7 The internal Enemy Other has been identified and 
slain.  
 Of course, Chibber’s book is neither the first Marxist critique of 
postcolonialism nor the first critique of postcolonialism’s historical and 
sociological analyses.8 However, it has been the most widely 
publicised and debated and, for this reason alone, merits scrutiny. 
Postcolonial Theory has also been successful in sparking a renewed 
debate on the relationship between Marxism and postcolonial theory, 
though perhaps not the one Chibber had hoped for.9 As Timothy 
Brennan points out, many reviewers of Postcolonial Theory have seen 
it as a ‘showdown between Marxism and postcolonial theory’, though 
                                            
7 Ahmed 2014; Schwartz 2014.  
8 Unfortunately, Chibber assigns many extant Marxist criticisms of postcolonial theory to the ‘literary 
and cultural fronts’ (Chibber 2013, pp. 4–5, n. 7) without acknowledging the much broader scope 
of critique represented by these works and others. As we shall see, a more direct engagement with 
this broader literature of Marxist works on postcolonialism would have likely strengthened Chibber’s 
analysis and perhaps corrected some of the more problematic aspects of his critique (cf. Lazarus 
2016). As Neil Lazarus notes in regard to Chibber’s consignment of such works (including his own) 
to solely cultural and literary issues, this enables ‘Chibber to claim that his study is the first to set 
out “to examine the framework that postcolonial studies has generated for historical analysis and, 
in particular, the analysis of what once was called Third Worldism”’ (Lazarus 2016, p. 91). The 
problem for Chibber, as Lazarus points out, is that many of these works do critique 
postcolonialism’s historical analyses. And given Chibber’s non-engagement with this wider body of 
literature, he ‘ends up having to reinvent the wheel on quite a few occasions’ (Lazarus 2016, p. 
92). For some particularly notable Marxist critiques in this regard, see the collection of essays in 
Bartolovich and Lazarus (eds.) 2002, especially chapters by Lazarus, Nimtz, and San Juan; Ahmad 
1992; Larsen 2001; Kaiwar 2004 and 2014; Parry 2004 [no such reference in bibliography – 
MC]; Lazarus and Varma 2008; Matin 2013.  
9 Cf. Brennan 2014; Murphet 2014; Nilsen 2015; Lazarus 2016; Parry 2017 [no such reference in 
bibliography – MC]. For useful overviews of postcolonialism’s relationship to the Marxist tradition, 
see Chakrabarty 2005; Young 2001; and Lazarus and Varma 2008. 
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Brennan suggests that the more interesting divide – unrecognised by 
either Chibber or most of his interlocutors – is one within Marxism itself: 
‘the internal bifurcation of humanist and social-scientific interpretations 
of Marxism’.10  
This is indeed an interesting question that sheds a rather 
different light on Chibber’s assessment of postcolonial theory’s 
‘rejection’ of Marxism,11 his dismissal of Robert Young’s tracing of 
postcolonialism back to the anti-colonial Marxist tradition as 
‘spectacularly mistaken’,12 and his characterisation of the original 
Subaltern Studies project as an ‘amalgam of liberal and Marxist 
elements’; a Marxism, yes, but ‘one of a particular kind’ that ‘would be 
scarcely recognized by many contemporary Marxists’.13 Perhaps. But 
then much the same could be said of Chibber’s own favoured brand of 
Marxism: a peculiar combination of liberal and Marxist elements 
drawing upon the Rational Choice Marxism of Jon Elster and Erik Olin 
Wright and the Political Marxism of Robert Brenner and Ellen Wood, 
dosed with a mix of Rawlsian social-contract theory (to which Chibber 
‘proudly’ adheres)14 and the work of modernisation theorist Amartya 
                                            
10 Brennan 2014, p. 82. 
11 Chibber 2013, p. 2.  
12 Chibber 2013, p. 290. 
13 Chibber 2013, p. 10; emphasis in original. 
14 See Chibber’s comments during a debate on ‘Marxism and the Legacy of Subaltern Studies’ held 
at the Historical Materialism New York 2013 Conference, which can be found at: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbM8HJrxSJ4>. 
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Sen. This is a Marxism, we agree, but also a Marxism of ‘a particular 
kind’, which at least some contemporary Marxists would not 
recognise.15 The Marxist historian Utathya Chattopadhyaya, for 
example, has criticised Chibber for ‘situating Marx and Rawls in the 
same genealogy where liberalism and Marxism appear wholly 
compatible under an Enlightenment umbrella’, which ‘is indicative of 
how liberal rights-based leftism has pervaded the space of rigorous 
Marxist critique’,16 while others have chastised the work as being too 
entrenched in rational choice methodological assumptions and thus 
‘undialectical’.17 There is some truth to these criticisms.18 However, as 
other reviewers have discussed these subjects at length elsewhere, 
we will instead focus on the substantive content of Chibber’s main 
criticisms of Subaltern Studies, which in part connects with some of 
the interpretive issues raised by Partha Chatterjee and others19 but 
which have remained inadequately assessed.  
                                            
15 Interestingly, the same historical socio-political conjuncture – the waning of the labour movement 
in the wake of the frontal assault by neoliberalism in the late 1970s and 1980s and the concomitant 
retreat of radicals to the academy – that produced the ostensibly disfigured form of Marxism 
practised by the Subalternists also produced the Analytical and Political-Marxist traditions that 
Chibber so heavily draws upon.  
16 Chattopadhyaya 2014. [Chattopadhyaya 2014? – MC] 
17 Levien 2013; Murphet 2013.  
18 Whether or not Chibber’s analysis is properly ‘Marxist enough’ is beside the point and not a 
particularly useful criterion for adjudicating the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments. 
Criticisms of Chibber’s particular methodology are, however, germane to such discussions and, in 
this respect, the rational choice assumptions of his analysis merit scrutiny (see Levien 2013; 
Murphet 2013). Most problematic in this regard is Chibber’s adherence to Rawlsian social-contract 
theory and a strong liberal-Enlightenment conception of universalism, both of which are 
Eurocentric. Situating Marx within this Enlightenment tradition is also somewhat problematic as he 
neither shared their form of method nor universalism, which is at the crux of many of the issues 
raised by Chibber’s critics. 
19 Chatterjee 2013; Levien 2013; Seth 2014.  
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One might nonetheless question the rationale for offering yet 
another critique of a work that has already received so much scrutiny. 
To be clear, our aim is not to provide a systematic critique of 
Postcolonial Theory, but rather to use Chibber’s Marxist-inspired 
critique of the Subaltern project as a foil to reassess the strengths and 
weakness of postcolonial theory, and Marxist engagements with 
postcolonialism more generally. We find this particularly useful for two 
reasons. First, given the attention Chibber’s work has garnered it will 
likely be a launching-pad for many subsequent discussions and 
debates on the potentials and pitfalls of postcolonialism, particularly 
within Marxist circles. For this reason, it is important for our discussion 
to assess the merits of Chibber’s critique and, in particular, his 
interpretation of the Subaltern Studies works he engages (particularly, 
for our purposes here, those of Dipesh Chakrabarty and Ranjit Guha).  
Our focus on Chibber’s work in this regard is, then, not due to 
the fact it represents the only systematic or even best example of an 
avowedly Marxist critique of postcolonial theory, but instead because 
it will likely prove a highly influential – and contested – one which, as 
we shall demonstrate, reveals as much as it obscures in critiquing the 
Subaltern project. Second, by critically examining Chibber’s work, we 
aim to better pinpoint exactly what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ with 
postcolonial studies. Specifically, an understanding of the origins of 
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capitalist modernity remains a relatively unexplored omission within 
postcolonial thought that, we argue, problematises the broader 
postcolonial project of ‘provincialising Europe’. We consider this 
especially apposite since Chibber’s own analysis focuses on a number 
of substantive historical sociological claims of the Subalternists and, in 
particular, Guha’s account of the early bourgeois revolutions in 
Europe. Against this backdrop, we then explore the affinities between 
Leon Trotsky’s notion of uneven and combined development and 
Postcolonialism,20 demonstrating how the former can provide a 
theoretical solution to the problem of Eurocentrism and understanding 
sociohistorical difference that the Subalternists identify but 
inadequately conceptualise.  
The themes raised by Chibber’s critique of the Subaltern project 
and our analysis of it are crucial to broader debates on the standing 
(and potential limits) of the universal in social theory, the logic and 
history of capitalist development and how it encounters societal 
multiplicity and difference, and therefore also our conceptions of the 
making of the modern world itself. Here it is worth highlighting one 
central point of critique offered by Chibber that we agree with and 
                                            
20 It is worth noting that postcolonialism is a highly diverse tradition of thought, which is not reducible 
to the work of any particular author or approach. In this article, we focus primarily on Subaltern 
Studies as one (hugely important, itself diverse) approach operating within this much wider 
tradition. We do so in part in order to tackle the criticisms offered by Chibber, who focuses 
exclusively on Subaltern Studies. 
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believe is highly significant. Chibber’s defence of the utility – indeed, 
necessity – of Marxist theories and concepts is, of course, one we 
strongly adhere to: hence our own use of Trotsky’s idea of uneven and 
combined development. Where we nonetheless depart from Chibber 
is over the extent to which these concepts and theories can be applied 
to particular spaces and histories in an unmediated fashion; that is to 
say, we differ on the extent to which they need to be ‘translated’ and 
reconfigured to fit the socio-historical specificities of different locales.21 
The uneven and interactive character of development across time and 
space demands the kind of ‘slightly stretched’ Marxism that Franz 
Fanon called for22 in understanding the colonial experience and which 
we have sought to further develop in explaining the rise of capitalism 
itself.23 The point is that Marxists should not shy away from the 
postcolonial critique of Eurocentrism, but rather directly engage with it 
as the Marxist tradition offers invaluable resources for breaking out of 
the Eurocentric cage.  
Before engaging with these issues, we must first address three 
fundamental questions: what are Chibber’s central criticisms of 
                                            
21 For a discussion of this point vis-à-vis the question of defining capitalism, see Anievas and 
Nişancıoğlu 2016.  
22 Fanon 1963, p. 40. 
23 Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015. 
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postcolonial theory? What constitutes postcolonialism as such? And 
what are its main theoretical aims and objects of analysis?  
 
 
The Problematic of Sociohistorical Difference 
 
‘Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital’: Argument Explained  
 
Chibber’s critique of postcolonial theory rests on three central claims. 
First, that Ranjit Guha’s argument that capitalism failed to ‘universalize 
once it left European shores’24 and the Subalternists’ denial of capital’s 
real universalising tendency25 are mistaken. Chibber claims that Guha 
(and the Subaltern project more generally) views capital’s 
universalising tendency as encompassing ‘two distinct elements’: (1) 
the ‘“self-expansion of capital”’, and; (2) the cultural and political 
transformations wrought in its wake.26 The problem for the 
Subalternists is that they conflate these two distinct elements, leading 
them to argue that if the latter socio-cultural transformation is absent 
within a particular society then capital’s universalising tendency must 
be judged a failure. However, the Subalternists’ rejection of capital’s 
                                            
24 Chibber 2014a, p. 312. 
25 Chibber 2013, p. 100.  
26 Chibber 2013, p. 110. 
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real universalising tendency is, Chibber argues, based upon a 
misunderstanding of what capitalism is in fact universalising: a 
particular reproductive strategy based on market-dependence.27 Once 
we correct this misunderstanding, then it becomes clear that capitalism 
has indeed universalised.  
Flowing from this line of critique emerges Chibber’s second key 
claim: that the developmental divide between ‘West’ and ‘East’ posited 
by Subalternists – in terms of the character of their respective national 
bourgeoisie, power relations, and the ‘political psychology’ motivating 
agents – is false. Chibber explicates these arguments in the historical 
and sociological chapters of the book on the early bourgeois 
revolutions (Chapters 2–4), power (Chapters 5–6), and the driving 
forces of subaltern resistance (Chapters 7–8). Third, given the 
‘essential convergence of capitalist strategies West and East’, Chibber 
claims that these two forms of society must be considered ‘variants of 
the same species’ and therefore may be understood and explained by 
theories emanating from the European experience.28 As such, Chibber 
argues for the applicability – indeed necessity – of Western-based 
(Enlightenment) universal categories and theories to capture the basic 
                                            
27 Chibber 2013, p. 100. 
28 Chibber 2013, p. 22.  
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structural developmental trajectories of societies both in the ‘West’ and 
‘East’.  
We will examine each of these claims below. Before doing so, 
we must first explicate what postcolonialism is and is not, and what are 
its main arguments and objects of analysis.  
 
Postcolonial Studies Engaging Capital  
 
Dealing with issues of historical difference and theoretical 
homogeneity in correcting the Eurocentric bias of social theory is at the 
heart of what might broadly be termed postcolonialism. Two central 
elements of postcolonialism are worth highlighting in this regard. 
Firstly, postcolonial scholars have sought to ‘provincialise’ Europe by 
decentring the Eurocentric claim that Western social forms and 
accompanying discourses are homogenously universal.29 Postcolonial 
approaches emphasise that European modernity and identity have 
always been constituted against – and through the subordination of – 
a non-Western ‘Other’.30  
In so doing, these authors stress the centrality of colonial 
practices as deeply embedded within the structure of European power 
                                            
29 Chakrabarty 2008. 
30 Said 1978.  
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and identity.31 Consequently, postcolonialism places the particularity 
of alternative visions of society originating in non-Western cases at the 
heart of its research programme.32 By ‘giving a voice to the Other’, 
postcolonialism shows how subaltern experiences have disrupted 
Eurocentric visions of history, thereby reasserting the significance of 
non-Western agency in world history.33  
The second step draws on the first in order to assert the 
heterogeneity of all social development and its irreducibility to 
exclusively European forms. According to postcolonialism, history is 
neither universal nor homogenous, but marked by difference, hybridity 
and ambivalence – in short, multiplicity. As such, postcolonialism also 
seeks to dislodge the linearity of historical time, and reject any 
possibility of stadial conceptions of development.34 For the Subaltern 
project in particular, as Partha Chatterjee suggests,35 this has meant 
studying how the dynamics and processes of primitive accumulation 
have operated under different historical conditions. We believe these 
two pointers – a non-Eurocentric and multilinear history – to be the 
primary strengths of the postcolonial approach and where its promise 
for the study and critique of capitalism lies. We examine each in turn, 
                                            
31 Cf. Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Bhambra 2007. 
32 Acharya 2011. 
33 Bhabha 2012. 
34 Cf. Bhambra 2007, especially pp. 34–55. 
35 Chatterjee 2013 (‘Marxism and the Legacy of Subaltern Studies’). 
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with a particular focus on Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe 
and Ranajit Guha’s Dominance without Hegemony, which form two of 
the main targets of Chibber’s critique.36 In this way, we hope to avoid 
some of the pitfalls of attempting a general overview of a highly 
heterogeneous research programme. Nonetheless, we also consider 
Chakrabarty’s and Guha’s work to be of particular importance to the 
‘postcolonial phase of Subaltern Studies’,37 and thus deserving of 
special attention.  
 
 
The Eurocentrism of Historicism 
 
Annihilating Difference through Time and Space 
 
Postcolonialism is, first and foremost, a specific reaction against 
attempts in Western thought – most notably, liberalism, modernisation 
theory and Marxism – to subsume all sociohistorical realities under the 
universal rubric of capitalist modernity. These universalist accounts 
suffer because they tend to either misread or, worse, overlook 
difference. Chakrabarty calls this ‘historicism’ – a way of writing history 
                                            
36 The other key works that Chibber examines are Partha Chatterjee’s The Nation and Its 
Fragments (1993) and Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (1986).  
37 Kaiwar 2014, p. 28. 
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that ‘both recognizes and neutralizes difference’, wherein ‘differences 
among histories’ are ‘overcome by capital in the long run’.38 Historicism 
tends to portray capitalism ‘as a force that encounters historical 
difference’ externally, struggles with this difference, and eventually 
negates or, more precisely, subsumes it ‘into historically diverse 
vehicles for the spread of its own logic’.39 
Such an approach carries with it a specific kind of highly 
politicised prescription. By positing Europe ‘as the site of the first 
occurrence of capitalism, modernity, or Enlightenment’, non-
Europeans were assigned a place ‘elsewhere’.40 Historical 
developments subsequently came to be judged almost exclusively 
against a European norm, and those histories which did not fit or 
comply with that norm were dismissed as ‘incomplete’. Differences 
come to be articulated through (and thus abolished by) essentialised 
binaries such as ‘pre-capitalism’ and ‘capitalism’, ‘modern’ and ‘pre-
modern’, ‘archaic’ and ‘contemporary’, ‘world-empires’ and ‘world-
system’, and the like.  
The very notion of incompleteness carries within it the sort of 
hierarchies that were present in colonialism (such as notions of 
‘barbarism’, ‘uncivility’, ‘backwardness’, ‘inadequacy’). Historicism 
                                            
38 Chakrabarty 2008, pp. 47–8.  
39 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 48. 
40 Chakrabarty 2008, pp. 7–8. 
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consequently posits ‘a measure of the cultural distance ... that was 
assumed to exist between the West and the non-West’,41 and became 
a way of saying to non-Europeans, ‘wait! not yet!’ in their calls for 
autonomy and recognition.42 This becomes most evident when 
examining the ‘peasant’ or ‘subaltern’. For example, Eric Hobsbawm’s 
characterisation of the (Indian) peasant in history as ‘pre-political’ and 
‘archaic’ is rooted in an understanding of non-European development 
as ‘incomplete’.43 These agents are seen as a survival or remnant of 
pre-capitalist relations. More recent iterations of this same strategy can 
be found, according to Chakrabarty, in notions of ‘uneven 
development’, which ascribes ‘at least an underlying structural unity (if 
not expressive totality) to historical process and time that makes it 
possible to identify certain elements in the present as “anachronistic” 
or “outmoded”’.44  
 
Traces of the Non-Universal 
 
                                            
41 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 7. Historicism is therefore heavily inscribed within the narrative of historical 
‘transition’. Within the transition narrative, history tends to be hung between ‘the two poles of 
homologous sets of oppositions: despotic/constitutional, medieval/modern, feudal/ capitalist’. In 
colonial histories then ‘this transition narrative was an unabashed celebration of the imperialists’ 
capacity for violence and conquest’ (Chakrabarty 2008, p. 32). 
42 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 8; see also Chatterjee 2010, pp. 296–7.  
43 Chakrabarty 2008, pp. 11–12. 
44 Chakrabarty 2008, pp. 12, 47. Gurminder Bhambra’s (2011) criticism of uneven and combined 
development similarly questions the conceptual and theoretical emphasis on an unproblematised 
conception of development. For an examination of such criticisms, see Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 
2015, pp. 43–63. 
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Historicism becomes especially problematic when we consider the 
centrality of the peasant in the making of modernity. Peasant agency, 
although distinctly non-bourgeois and non-secular and historically 
connected to practices that existed prior to colonialism, was still 
unequivocally both political and modern.45 Indeed, as David 
Washbrook argues, the very prevalence of a ‘backward’ or ‘traditional’ 
stratum of society (in contrast to the ‘modern’) was itself a result of the 
construction of colonialism in South Asia.46  
The act of subsuming the peasant under the rubric of the ‘pre-
modern’, ‘pre-capitalist’ or ‘pre-capital’ therefore reflects nothing other 
than the violent attempt to fit the subaltern ‘into the rationalist grid of 
elite consciousness’, in a way that makes them intelligible to 
colonialists and bourgeois nationalists.47 The upshot is an otherwise 
politically significant peasantry becoming silenced, misrepresented or 
marginalised by history-writing. For this reason, Chatterjee seeks to 
recast the historical question of non-European modernity in different 
terms:  
  
Are we to explain ‘retarded’ capitalism simply in terms of a 
                                            
45 As such, the peasant is lauded within postcolonialism as the agent that subverts historicism by 
its very agency, by its very participation in the ‘path’ of history it has been denied entry to – it is the 
non- rather than pre-bourgeois, the non- not pre-modern (Chakrabarty 2008, pp. 10–11). 
46 Washbrook 1990. 
47 Chatterjee 2010, p. 292. 
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time lag, or should we treat it as an expression of the historical 
limits of Capital’s universalising mission? To choose the latter 
would require us to abandon a methodological procedure 
designed to explain the emergence of capitalism as a 
universal system of generalized commodity production and to 
substitute in its place one that enables us to identify and 
explain the limits to the historical actualisation of Capital as a 
universal economic category.48 
  
One of the primary concerns of postcolonialism is therefore to 
‘provincialise Europe’ by showing ‘how universalistic thought was 
always and already modified by particular histories’.49 To put it 
differently, it seeks to demonstrate that concepts and categories that 
purport to be universal always contain within them traces of the not-
universal.  
This is evident in two respects. First, postcolonialists seek to show 
how seemingly ‘universal’ concepts of political modernity ‘encounter 
pre-existing concepts, categories, institutions and practices through 
which they get translated and configured differently’.50 Second, 
                                            
48 Chatterjee 1983, pp. 64–5. 
49 Chakrabarty 2008, p. xiv. 
50 Chakrabarty 2008, p. xii; interestingly, Chakrabarty implies that this is itself a universal law of 
history, when he suggests that ‘if this argument is true of India, then it is true of any other place as 
well, including Europe’. See also Chatterjee 2010, p. 294. 
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postcolonialists aim to demonstrate how ostensibly universal 
categories are in fact themselves particular and provincial, in that they 
were the product of a specific European experience.51 Chatterjee 
highlights that the supposed universalism of European social forms in 
fact masks a particular historical experience, which only became 
universal due to the specific history of capitalism: 
 
If there is one great moment that turns the provincial thought 
of Europe to universal philosophy, the parochial history of 
Europe to universal history, it is the moment of capital – 
capital that is global in its territorial reach and universal in its 
conceptual domain. It is the narrative of capital that can turn 
the violence of mercantile trade, war, genocide, conquest and 
colonialism into a story of universal progress, development, 
modernization, and freedom.52  
 
The universality of capital thereby allows for the writing of a universal 
history in a way previously unimaginable. For the Subalternists, this 
universality does not, however, imply an emptying-out or 
                                            
51 Chakrabarty 2008, p. xii. 
52 Chatterjee 1993, p. 235. 
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homogenisation of the concrete particularities of any given society, but 
can in fact work to reconstitute and produce such societal differences.  
 
The Internal Limits to Capital’s Universalising Tendency 
 
It should be clear from the outset, then, that the likes of Chatterjee, 
Chakrabarty and Guha do not deny capital’s universalising tendency.53 
Indeed, nowhere do each of the Subaltern Studies scholars castigated 
by Chibber deny that capital demonstrates a real tendency toward 
universalisation. Rather, their claim is an altogether different one: that 
capital’s universalising tendency is necessarily limited, always and 
everywhere partial – all points made by Chibber himself.  
For example, Chakrabarty highlights the ‘“resistance to capital”’ 
that Marx speaks of as ‘something internal to capital itself’. Hence, ‘the 
self-reproduction of capital’, as Chakrabarty notes, going on to invoke 
another quote from Marx,  
 
                                            
53 Chibber claims, for example, that his historical-sociological analysis proves that ‘the 
universalization of capital is real, pace the claims of the Subalternist collectivity’, while elsewhere 
noting that they are ‘wrong in identifying what is actually universalized’ by capital (Chibber 2013, 
pp. 285, 100). Chibber ultimately overstates his case by arguing that postcolonialists seek to 
‘defend the specificity of the East’ by ‘denying the applicability of Western theory’s universalizing 
categories’ and ‘denying that capital successfully universalizes’ (Chibber 2013, p. 212). As we shall 
see, none of these charges are accurate. 
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‘moves in contradictions which are constantly overcome but 
just as constantly posited’. Just because, he [Marx] adds, 
capital gets ideally beyond every limit posed to it by ‘national 
barriers and prejudices’, ‘it does not by any means follow that 
it has really overcome it’.54  
 
This passage taken from Marx’s Grundrisse is also quoted in full by 
Guha, after which he writes: ‘Nothing could be more explicit and indeed 
more devastating than this critique of the universalist pretensions of 
capital’.55 This is important given that Guha is here explicitly claiming 
that while capital’s universalising drive is a real historical tendency it is 
also one met by certain counter-tendencies or limitations inhering in 
capital’s own logic of process.  
 Moreover, following Marx again, Guha views this contradictory 
unity of universalising and counter-universalising tendencies as 
operating within both ‘the East’ and ‘West’ (specifically Europe). For 
Marx, Guha explains:  
 
the discrepancy between the universalizing tendency of 
capital as an ideal and the frustration of that tendency in 
                                            
54 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 85. 
55 Guha 1997, p. 16. 
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reality was, for him, a measure of the contradictions of 
Western bourgeois societies of his time and the differences 
which gave each of them its specificity.56  
 
In contrast to Chibber’s critique, capital’s ‘universalising mission’ was 
limited in both the Global South and North for Marx (as Guha re-
narrates him) – the latter being exemplified by the ‘incomplete’ 
character of the ‘bourgeois revolutions’ of Marx’s own time as 
demonstrated in Germany and elsewhere. Thus, the ‘structural fault in 
the historic project of the bourgeoisie’ Guha highlights57 was not simply 
between, as Chibber asserts, ‘the Indian bourgeoisie and its 
predecessors’ in Europe.58 It was instead a broader spatio-temporal 
fault-line traversing the entire world: one between the ‘early’ bourgeois 
revolutions in England and France, on the one hand, and the later 
bourgeois revolutions running east of the Elbe in Europe as well as 
those beyond Europe as with India, on the other. This understanding 
of the differentiated spatio-temporal ordering of the bourgeois 
revolutions, whereby the further they travelled in space and time from 
capitalism’s inception the more differences accumulated,59 is, we 
                                            
56 Guha 1997, p. 16; emphasis ours. 
57 Guha 1997, p. 5. 
58 Chibber 2013, p. 39. 
59 Anderson 1992, p. 116.  
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would argue, more consistent with the historical record than Chibber’s 
own account of the English and French revolutions that denies their 
anti-feudal character whilst misconstruing the role the bourgeoisie 
played in them.60  
 
The Violence of Abstraction  
 
The Liminality of the Universal 
 
The postcolonial project of provincialising Europe is therefore not 
about rejecting the universality of capitalist modernity out of hand; or, 
in Chakrabarty’s terms, it is not a project of cultural relativism.61 These 
authors accept that capitalism has a universal reach, only too brutally 
demonstrated by the histories of colonialism and imperialism. What 
they reject is using this universal conception of capital as the ‘sole’ or 
‘sovereign’ author of historical processes, in a way that turns all other 
particular histories into differentiated expressions of European 
                                            
60 Cf. Chibber 2013, pp. 54–79. Our alternative understanding of the English and French capitalist 
revolutions is explicated at length in Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015, Chapter 6. An important point 
Chibber is correct in stressing is that neither the English nor the French bourgeoisie aimed to create 
liberal-democratic orders. The construction of such orders was instead the product of the subaltern 
struggles emanating from workers and peasants in the course of the revolutionary process. Why 
this point requires an entire chapter recounting the history of the English and French revolutions is 
unclear, particularly in light of the criticisms of Chibber’s misreading of Guha’s argument (see 
below). 
61 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 43. 
24 | P a g e  
 
history.62 The aim is to ‘displace a hyperreal Europe from the center 
toward which all historical imagination currently gravitates’63 by 
(re)writing these non-universal, particular and local histories ‘back in’. 
From this perspective, postcolonial scholars seek to highlight the 
inherent liminality of universal categories in fully capturing the broad 
range of sociohistorical processes operating in the ‘extra-European’ 
and European world. This in turn demands an examination of the 
myriad hybrid sociopolitical forms produced by capital’s 
universalisation and thus interaction and contestation with ‘pre-existing 
concepts, categories, institutions and practices’64 in both European 
and non-European locales.  
This aim of identifying parts of social life not subsumed by the 
universality of capital leads Chakrabarty to a highly stimulating reading 
of Marx’s later writings.65 In particular, Chakrabarty singles out Marx’s 
category of ‘abstract labour’ as the concept that captures the 
homogenous and homogenising tendency in capital. According to 
Marx, the practice, act, or performance of abstraction becomes 
apparent in workplace discipline, wherein the ‘life’ or ‘living labour’ of 
the worker is abstracted-from and subsumed by ‘dead labour’ – the 
                                            
62 Taylor 2010.  
63 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 45. 
64 Chakrabarty 2008, p. xii. 
65 Chakrabarty 2008, pp. 59–68. 
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machine. Such an abstraction enables the homogenisation and thus 
equalisation of various, particular or concrete instances of labour to 
become the measure of wealth under capitalism. It is also through this 
abstraction that wealth itself is created. In order to extend relative 
surplus labour, labour-saving technologies are introduced, thus 
reducing to a minimum the amount of living labour necessary for 
production. In this respect, the abstraction of labour also acts as the 
mechanism through which labour is ‘emancipated’.66 This tendency to 
simultaneously exploit and emancipate labour thus constitutes what 
Marx calls the ‘moving contradiction’ of capital.67  
For Chakrabarty, the significance of these claims about abstract 
labour is that inscribed in the very universality of abstract labour is its 
opposite – real labour. This denotes the specific acts of labour that 
make abstract labour a possibility, but also points to the element of 
‘life’ or ‘living’ for the worker, and the attempt of the worker to re-
appropriate their ‘life’, as the basis of resistance against capital. Thus, 
given in the very universality of abstract labour is a particularity – real 
labour – that remains never quite conquered by capital. It is on the 
basis of this distinction that Chakrabarty introduces the concepts of 
‘History 1’ and ‘History 2’.  
                                            
66 Marx 1973, p. 701. 
67 Marx 1973, p. 706. 
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 History 1 refers to that past presupposed by capital, ‘a past 
posited by capital itself as its precondition’ and ‘its invariable result’.68 
Although Chakrabarty leaves this largely unspecified, it is clear from 
his preceding discussion that what he has in mind is abstract labour. 
In contrast, History 2 refers to those histories that are encountered by 
capital ‘not as antecedents’ established by itself, nor ‘as forms of its 
own life-process’.69 History 2s are not ‘outside’ of capital or History 1. 
Instead, they exist ‘in proximate relationship to it’,70 whilst potentially 
‘interrupt[ing] and punctuat[ing] the run of capital’s own logic’.71  
Although Chakrabarty is clear in his definition, he is somewhat 
elusive when it comes to the exact content of History 2. Nonetheless, 
with his discussion of abstract labour in mind, he does appear to be 
talking about those elements involved in the reproduction of labour-
power that are not subsumed by abstract labour itself. Others, most 
notably feminist authors, have theorised some of these aspects of 
History 2 as the ‘reproductive’ or ‘unwaged’ sphere.72 History 2 also 
draws affinities with biopolitics, those elements of politics and society 
found ‘in the person’s bodily habits, in unselfconscious collective 
practices, in his or her reflexes about what it means to relate to objects 
                                            
68 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 63. 
69 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 63; Marx 1973, pp. 105–6. 
70 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 66. 
71 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 64. 
72 See e.g. Delphy and Leonard 1984; Federici 2012. 
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in the world as a human being and together with other human beings 
in his given environment’.73 History 2s can additionally involve aspects 
that are in fact antithetical or generate resistance to capital’s own ‘life-
process’ – that is, capital’s logic of self-reproduction – which might 
include particular cultural formations, customs and ideologies. A 
concrete example of this element would be the pre-existing cultures of 
workers in the Calcutta Jute mills that Chakrabarty examined in a 
previous study.74 Hence, History 2s may well include non-capitalist, 
pre-capitalist or local social relations and processes. However, the 
concept is not exhausted by these, and can refer to universal and 
global categories, social relations and processes.  
Indeed, following Marx, two of the examples Chakrabarty gives 
of History 2s include commodities and money – two universal 
categories central to the functioning of capitalism.75 Hence, Chibber’s 
criticism that Chakrabarty uses History 2 to refer to merely local 
(‘Eastern’) manifestations of abstract and universal (or ‘Western’) 
                                            
73 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 66. 
74 Chakrabarty 2000. 
75 ‘[Capital] originally finds the commodity already in existence, but not as its own product, and 
likewise finds money circulation, but not as an element in its own reproduction... But both of them 
must be destroyed as independent forms and subordinated to industrial capital’ (Marx quoted in 
Chakrabarty 2008, p. 64). Chakrabarty therefore notes (Chakrabarty 2008, p. 64) that ‘the 
heterogeneity Marx reads into the history of money and commodity shows that the relations that 
do not contribute to the reproduction of the logic of capital can be intimately intertwined with the 
relations that do’. Put in different terms, while History 2s may lie outside capital’s logic of self-
reproduction, through their relational position within the wider totality of capitalist society they can 
nonetheless function to reproduce it.  
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processes76 is inaccurate. History 1 is not simply ‘an abstract 
definition’, the ‘universal’ or ‘the West’; nor is History 2 by contrast seen 
as a concrete manifestation, local, and/or Eastern,77 as Chibber reads 
it – notably, Chakrabarty himself nowhere defines History 1 and History 
2 as any of these.78  
Rather, History 1 functions as an analytical history. It abstracts 
from specific instances in order to ‘make all places [histories] 
exchangeable [comparable] with one another’.79 But, moreover, the 
conception of History 1 as a set of abstract categories – abstract 
labour, exchange-value, etc. – designate what Alfred Sohn-Rethel 
called ‘real abstractions’.80 These are more than just ‘abstract 
descriptions’ or ‘abstract delineations’ – that is, concepts – but 
relations and processes that affect the functioning of capitalism as a 
mode of production. The very act of abstracting – as both Marx and 
Chakrabarty argue – from the individual concrete labour of each 
                                            
76 So when Chibber castigates Chakrabarty for not comprehending that ‘no practice ever conforms 
in every detail to its abstract conception. It is not an insight, therefore, to declare that this or that 
social fact has elements in it that are not present in its abstract delineation’ (Chibber 2013, p. 227), 
it is clear that this is down to a fundamental misreading of the meaning of the ‘abstract’ in both 
Marx and Chakrabarty. 
77 Chibber 2013, pp. 235, 238. 
78 As David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah put the matter (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, pp. 167–
8), Chakrabarty’s reading of Marx’s narrative in terms of History 1 and 2 ‘allows two historical 
stories: one comprising elements that are the logical/historical preconditions of capital (History 1) 
and another with elements that are not logical/historical preconditions but which capital 
nevertheless incorporates, internalizes, and transforms (History 2)’. As this definition also makes 
clear, Chibber’s dichotomous interpretation of History 1 as Western, abstract and universal, and 
History 2 as Eastern, particular and local, is wide off the mark.  
79 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 71. 
80 Sohn-Rethel 1978.  
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worker is the precondition for their exchangeability on the market, and 
hence the precondition for capitalism as such. History 2s can, by 
contrast, provide ‘affective narratives of human belonging where life 
forms, although porous to one another, do not seem exchangeable 
through a third term of equivalence such as abstract labour’.81 In this 
way, History 2s do not simply appear as a differentiated functional 
moment in the development of capitalism. As Marcus Taylor argues, 
‘while capital may indeed seek to rewrite social life to further the cause 
of “endless accumulation”, it does not do so – to twist a famous maxim 
– in conditions of its own choosing’. Capital’s universalisation must 
instead be understood as ‘a process that constantly inhabits, remakes 
and is fundamentally remade in its interaction with institutional forms, 
regimes of value and alternative temporalities that have their lineage 
in other histories and modes of being’.82  
 
The Dialectics of History 1 and 2 
 
Chakrabarty’s critique of Marxism’s ‘blind spot’83 is then focused on its 
inability (or unwillingness) to take History 2 ‘seriously’.84 The Marxist 
                                            
81 Chakrabarty 2010, p. 71. 
82 Taylor 2010, p. 5; see similarly, Shilliam 2009, p. 72. 
83 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 67. 
84 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 69. 
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analysis of the capitalist mode of production tends to create – and 
methodologically situate itself within – ‘abstract space’, which erases 
‘the local’ and ‘evacuates all lived sense of place’.85 Although History 
1 may seek to negate, destroy or sublate History 2, there is no 
guarantee that ‘this could ever be complete’.86 Therefore, the correct 
method, according to Chakrabarty, is to write history in a way that 
combines History 1s and History 2s, wherein the ‘universal history of 
capital and the politics of human belonging are allowed to interrupt 
each other’s narrative’; and wherein capital’s ‘histories are History 1s 
constitutively but unevenly modified by more and less powerful History 
2s’.87 Most revealingly, the category through which Chakrabarty seeks 
to elucidate such ‘difference’, ‘modifications’ and ‘interruptions’ is 
Marx’s (universal) category of real labour, the category that alongside 
– and in tension with – abstract labour inheres in all commodities in the 
capitalist mode of production.  
It is clear, then, that when Chakrabarty is talking about History 
2s – about real labour, about difference – he is doing so in a way that 
both depends upon and reveals a dialectical relation with History 1s, 
with abstract labour, and with universality as such. That is, ‘just as real 
labor cannot be thought of outside of the problematic of abstract labor, 
                                            
85 Chakrabarty 2008, p. xvii. 
86 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 65. 
87 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 70. 
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subaltern history cannot be thought of outside of the global narrative 
of capital’.88 As such, it is important to reject Chibber’s denunciation 
that Chakrabarty is providing ‘a license for exoticism’.89 As 
Chakrabarty explicitly states, his argument is ‘not against the idea of 
universals as such’, but an emphasis on how ‘the universal was a 
highly unstable figure, a necessary placeholder in our attempt to think 
through questions of modernity’.90 Chakrabarty is unequivocal in his 
description of History 2; these are ‘histories that capital everywhere – 
even in the West – encounters as its antecedent, which do not belong 
to its life process’.91 Insofar as History 2 refers to processes and 
relations ‘within the time horizon of capital’,92 insofar as these can be 
local or universal, insofar as they are equally relevant to the study of 
‘the East’ as well as ‘the West’, insofar as History 1 means something 
other than ‘abstract definitions’ or ‘universals’, and insofar as it 
                                            
88 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 95. 
89 Chibber 2013, p. 238; emphasis in original. To be clear, this is not to deny that some of 
Chakrabarty’s empirical analyses fall prey to such ‘exoticism’ – of treating local or traditional 
particularities as unproblematic sites of resistance to capital’s universalising reach. This is well 
exemplified by Chakrabarty’s (Chakrabarty 2008, Chapter 8) problematic treatment of the figure of 
the grihalakshmi (goddess of the house) in Bengali bhadralok’s attempts to celebrate Indian cultural 
difference against the dominance of a universal(ising) colonial modernity (see Bandyopadhyay 
2004, p. 183). However, the point we are making here is that Chakrabarty’s definition of History 2 
cannot be logically reduced to such ‘exoticism’ or particularities as it explicitly incorporates 
universal elements and phenomena. We thank an anonymous review for raising this important 
issue in pushing us to further clarify our position. 
90 Chakrabarty 2008, p. xiii. 
91 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 69; emphasis ours. It is worth noting that by invoking the term ‘antecedent’, 
Chakrabarty is not making an exclusively diachronic argument, although he does not deny the 
possibility of it being used diachronically. 
92 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 95. 
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identifies concrete processes and social relations, Chibber’s following 
charge is difficult to sustain:  
 
Chakrabarty argues the universalization of capital is a myth, 
that it is forever incomplete because the actual practice of 
reproduction in the East does not conform to its abstract 
description as presented in the works of Marx or other 
Enlightenment thinkers. And the reason it does not conform 
to that description is that History 2 forces modifications on it.93 
 
Chibber’s reading not only misses the subtleties of Chakrabarty’s 
argument, it also imposes a highly contradictory reading of the 
tensions and antagonisms Chakrabarty elucidates in his own analysis 
of capital. On the one hand, Chibber insists that Chakrabarty is 
incorrect to argue History 2 necessarily forces modifications on History 
1, or that the former alters the latter’s ‘fundamental logic’. Specifically, 
whatever impact History 2 might have on History 1, the latter’s ‘rules 
of reproduction’ will not have been ‘disturbed, even if the workings, or 
the form in which they are instantiated, may have been affected to 
some degree’.94 Chibber then highlights the numerous ways in which 
                                            
93 Chibber 2013, p. 227.  
94 Chibber 2013, p. 227. 
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certain History 2s are tolerated or wholesale appropriated by capital to 
facilitate the latter’s functioning.95 The implication here is that the study 
of History 2 does not carry the weight of significance that Chakrabarty 
assigns to it. 
None of this, however, actually refutes Chakrabarty’s argument 
since, as we have seen, for Chakrabarty commodities and money – 
History 2s – are central to the functioning of capitalism as a mode of 
production. In other words, Chakrabarty clearly does not envision 
every aspect of History 2 as necessarily antagonistic to the 
reproduction of capital. How else could he possibly claim that 
commodities and money are part of History 2 – ‘something belonging 
to the “cellular” structure of capital’?96 Chibber argues, by contrast, that 
‘[e]ven while some relations associated with History 2 might be 
dysfunctional for capital, it is simply impossible to image that every 
such relation would have to be. Chakrabarty seems to equate the 
autonomy of a practice from the logic of capitalism with that practice 
being corrosive to capitalism’.97 Contrast this with what Chakrabarty 
actually says about History 2s:  
                                            
95 Chibber 2013, pp. 236–7. 
96 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 64.  
97 Chibber 2013, p. 228; emphasis in original. Chibber here backs this position by arguing that 
Chakrabarty ‘defines History 2 simply as those practices that “do not lend themselves to the logic 
of reproduction of capital”’ (Chibber 2013, p. 228). But compare this with the full quote from 
Chakrabarty: ‘I therefore understand Marx to be saying that “antecedent to capital” [elements of 
History 2] are not only the relationships that constitute History 1 but also other relationships that do 
not lend themselves to the logic of reproduction of capital’ (Chakrabarty 2008, p. 64; emphasis 
ours). That is to say, aspects of History 2 can be fundamental to the functioning of capital, without 
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These relations could be central to capital’s self-reproduction, 
and yet it is also possible for them to be oriented to structures 
that do not contribute to such reproduction. History 2s are 
thus not pasts separate from capital: they inhere in capital and 
yet interrupt and punctuate the run of capital’s own logic.98  
 
In other words, Chakrabarty is arguing that aspects of History 2 can 
indeed be fundamental to the functioning of capital, without necessarily 
constituting part of capital’s own ‘logical presuppositions’.99  
But the contradiction in Chibber’s argument becomes even more 
apparent once he insists that there is no necessity within History 1s to 
subjugate History 2s.100 Chibber argues that capital can happily 
tolerate History 2s autonomously existing side-by-side with History 1s, 
without the former being ‘corrosive’ to the latter.101 But for Chibber to 
say this is to deny the very universalising drive that both Marx and 
Chakrabarty insist exists at the core of capital’s ‘laws of motion’. It is to 
                                            
necessarily forming part of capital’s own ‘logical presuppositions’ (Chakrabarty 2008, p. 64): again, 
take Chakrabarty’s examples of money and commodity, to which one could also add the 
‘reproductive sphere’, patriarchy, and systemic racism – all of which, we would argue, are 
constitutive elements of capitalism (see Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015). 
98 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 64; emphasis ours. Relatedly, as Chakrabarty writes elsewhere: ‘Capitalist 
production … has thrived in a variety of cultures, ranging from the most hierarchical to the most 
democratic. Perhaps we have overestimated capitalism’s need or capacity to homogenize the 
cultural conditions necessary for its own reproduction’ (Chakrabarty 2000, p. xiii). 
99 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 64. 
100 Chibber 2013, p. 233. 
101 Chibber 2013, p. 228. 
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say that capital does not persistently seek to subordinate processes 
and social relations not posited by itself to its own logic. It is to deny 
the multivalent processes of subsumption, expansion, colonisation and 
accumulation that marks both the logic and history of capitalism102 – 
surely both rather bizarre claims for any Marxist-inspired 
understanding of capitalism as a totalising mode of production. In 
short, Chibber’s misreading of History 1 and History 2 leads him to 
make the very argument that he criticises Chakrabarty for: that the 
universalisation of capital – insofar as it entails more than the simple 
generalisation of market-dependency103 – is wholly a myth. 
 
Resistance to Capital: History 1, 2 or Both? 
 
Chibber, however, offers one way out of this contradiction. He argues 
that since there is no necessary antagonism between History 1 and 
History 2, History 2 cannot (necessarily) destabilise History 1. Rather, 
the universalising tendency of capital is limited because it is 
                                            
102 Chibber claims ‘the motivation behind this assault on the worker comes from the threat posed 
by History 2’, therefore, ‘[Chakrabarty] is asserting that capital will not tolerate in its workers any 
vestige of local customs, practices, or expectations that do not conform to its functional 
requirements’ (Chibber 2013, pp. 235, 237). But Chakrabarty does not say this. What he does say 
is that labour processes under capitalism tend to subsume, subjugate and thus abstract from 
History 2s. This is not a controversial argument for a Marxist. Whether the motive is to destroy 
History 2, or extract surplus or tickle kittens, is neither here nor there. To deny that the labour 
process does subjugate and thus abstract from the lives of the individual worker is to deny a basic 
premise of Marx’s theory of capital – i.e. abstract labour. 
103 Chibber 2013, p. 111. 
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‘destabilized by elements internal to History 1’, a possibility that 
‘Chakrabarty never seriously considers’.104 Putting aside the fact that 
Chakrabarty devotes a whole subsection in Provincializing Europe 
titled ‘Abstract Labour as Critique’ where he does exactly this (and see 
also the above quotes drawing on Marx), let us examine Chibber’s own 
claim that elements internal to History 1 can destabilise capital.  
Chibber suggests that the primary source of instability in 
capitalism comes from workers opposing capital, from the former 
seeking to assert their ‘wants and needs’ against the latter. He then 
goes on to highlight that such wants and needs drove subaltern 
struggles to limit the length of the working day, which subsequently led 
to a systemic abandonment of the capitalist strategy of extracting 
absolute surplus value, moving capital to a strategy of extracting 
relative surplus value. Hence, History 1s were modified and limited not 
by History 2s, but by History 1s – that is, by workers. As Chibber puts 
it: ‘If there is any genuine source of opposition to capital’s 
universalizing drive, it is the equally universal struggle by subaltern 
classes to defend their basic humanity’.105 
Interestingly, this argument bears some striking similarities with 
the one offered by Chakrabarty,  
                                            
104 Chibber 2013, p. 230. 
105 Chibber 2013, p. 233; emphasis ours. 
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subaltern histories do not refer to a resistance prior and 
exterior to the narrative space created by capital; they cannot 
therefore be defined without reference to the category 
‘capital’. Subaltern studies … can only situate itself 
theoretically at the juncture where we give up neither Marx 
nor ‘difference’, for … the resistance it speaks of is something 
that can happen only within the time horizon of capital, and 
yet it has to be thought of as something that disrupts the unity 
of that time. Unconcealing the tension between real and 
abstract labor ensures that capital/commodity has 
heterogeneities and incommensurabilities inscribed in its 
core.106 
 
There is one difference between Chakrabarty and Chibber, however, 
since the former sees subaltern resistance situated in the (universal) 
category of ‘real labour’; that is, History 2. For it is the antagonism 
between abstract labour (History 1) and real labour (History 2) that 
Chakrabarty considers to be at the heart of his Marx-inspired research 
programme.  
                                            
106 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 95. 
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In contrast, due to his misapprehension that ‘History 1 = universals’, 
Chibber argues that subaltern resistance is a part of History 1, and as 
a consequence feels compelled to invoke the universality of human 
nature – ‘the interest in well-being’107 as the source of workers’ 
resistance and opposition to capital. But this characteristic, by virtue of 
it being based on an a priori conception of human nature, by virtue of 
it being something antecedent to that which is posited by capital, is – 
indeed, can only be – part of History 2. To claim otherwise – to claim 
human nature is History 1 – is to argue that capital posits human nature 
as part of its own life-process, bringing Chibber suspiciously close to 
ideologues who argue capitalism is merely an expression of human 
nature. It is also to claim that capital posits ‘the interest in well-being’ 
as ‘part of its own life-process’. But if anything the whole point of the 
Marxist critique of capitalism is that the opposite is true – capital neither 
expresses human nature, nor does it fulfil the interests of ‘basic 
humanity’ and ‘well-being’. There is, then, much at stake in retaining 
some of the insights gleaned from Chakrabarty’s interpretation of 
Marx. For his emphasis on the tensions between History 1s and 
History 2s appears crucial to mitigating against the potentially 
ahistorical, essentialising and (economically) homogenous reading of 
                                            
107 Chibber 2013, p. 231. 
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capitalism and the resistance to it found in Chibber’s alternative. While 
Chibber is very careful, as he continually insists, not to deny that all 
sorts of social and cultural differences can exist under capitalism,108 
his conception of what capital’s universalisation actually entails tells us 
very little about the differential dynamics of capitalism or the struggles 
generated by it within any particular locale.109 The question that must 
be asked is then: What tools does Chibber’s alternative 
conceptualisation provide Marxists in understanding and theorising 
difference? Very few it seems. Yet surely this is an important 
component for developing concrete political strategies and tactics in 
different sociopolitical and cultural contexts. Moreover, given that the 
study of sociohistorical difference is the defining problematic of 
postcolonial theory, Chibber’s failure to elaborate any alternative 
                                            
108 As he makes clear, ‘capitalism is perfectly compatible with a diverse set of political and cultural 
formations’ while also noting that capitalism is in fact ‘not only consistent with great heterogeneity 
and hierarchy, but systematically generates them’ (Chibber 2013, p. 285; see similarly pp. 150–1 
and 243–6). 
109 In addition, the idea that capitalism’s universalisation should be conceived as the generalisation 
of a ‘reproductive shift toward market dependence’ among economic units (Chibber 2013, p. 110) 
begs the question of the accuracy of this description in understanding the real history of capitalist 
development and its expansion. Is it really the case that oligopolistic and state-run forms of 
enterprise are market-dependent in any meaningful sense? Under oligopolistic market conditions, 
is it not the market that is more dependent on and determined by the dominant firms, rather than 
the other way around? And what about the role of state interventionism more generally? Can any 
of these aspects of ‘really existing capitalism’ be accounted for in a satisfactory way by Chibber’s 
Political Marxist-inspired conception of capital’s universalising tendency? In critiquing the Political 
Marxist conception of capitalism, Neil Davidson argues (Davidson 2012, p. 418) that ‘“pure” 
capitalist social property relations have never been completely dominant anywhere, nor – unless 
socialists completely fail in their objectives – will they ever be’. Nonetheless, for Chibber’s analysis, 
the answers to these questions are unclear given the level of analytical abstraction he formulates 
his conception at. 
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conceptual framework besides a brief run through some previous 
Marxist attempts is a rather strange and problematic omission.  
For the above reasons, the kind of method Chakrabarty 
proposes strikes us as an altogether positive advance for scholars 
going about writing the history of capitalism.110 Taking a multiple and 
differentiated agency as a starting point, and subsequently exploring 
encounters and interactions within this multiplicity is the kind of 
approach Marxists should embrace, not reject. It is therefore worth 
briefly noting some of the affinities between Chakrabarty’s approach 
(and postcolonialism more broadly) and the theory of uneven and 
combined development, while demonstrating how Trotsky’s idea 
assists in redressing some fundamental shortcomings of postcolonial 
theory.111  
 
 
                                            
110 We have sought to construct a history of the making of capitalism in which the sorts of histories 
targeted by ‘History 2’ – specifically those found in the ‘unwaged’ or ‘reproductive’ sphere – are 
understood as constitutive of ‘History 1’ – the formation of ‘abstract labour’ and an industrial 
proletariat as such (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015). 
111 Although Chibber himself invokes Trotsky’s idea at the very end of Postcolonial Theory as one 
of a number Marxist attempts to ‘understanding the specificity of the East’ (Chibber 2013, p. 291), 
he does not employ the theory in developing any of his substantive critiques of Subaltern Studies. 
Neil Lazarus (Lazarus 2016, p. 106) finds this absence of the theory of uneven and combined 
development in the ‘main body of his [Chibber’s] study’ a ‘failure that simply baffles understanding’. 
On one level this is true: how could Chibber not draw on a concept that is so applicable in making 
his case against postcolonialism? On another level, however, it makes sense given that the entire 
thrust of Trotsky’s theory is to illuminate and articulate the interactively-generated developmental 
differences between societies and the sociological amalgamations within societies that 
problematise and transcend the kind of abstract definitions of capitalism and static comparative 
perspectives provided by Chibber and the theoretical frameworks upon which he draws (cf. 
Murphet 2014, pp. 161–2). For Marxist critiques of postcolonialism that employ uneven and 
combined development in a more systematic way, see Matin 2013 and Kaiwar 2014. 
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The Limits of Postcolonial Theory 
 
Postcolonialism and Uneven and Combined Development  
 
To begin with, positing a ‘not-yet’ to ‘backward’ peoples was a 
prevalent and distinctly ‘historicist’ sentiment within Russia precisely at 
the time Trotsky was developing the theory of uneven and combined 
development. Pointedly, Trotsky rejected the Menshevik idea of 
‘waiting’ for a bourgeois stage before a proletarian revolution could 
occur and insisted on the ‘now’. The Bolshevik Revolution and strategy 
of permanent revolution are direct outcomes of this, while uneven and 
combined development was its methodological and theoretical 
foundation. This is especially revealing given the centrality of the 
peasant – the supposedly non-modern agent par excellence – in 
Russian social life generally, and the Bolshevik Revolution specifically. 
In the History of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky’s explicitly 
characterises Russia’s revolutionary conditions in terms of the 
imbalance between town and country, and revolutionary agency in 
terms of the combination of a newly-formed industrial proletariat and 
the pre-existing peasantry. We can trace this back even further to 
Marx, who himself saw the potential for a communist revolution in 
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Russia ahead of the capitalist heartlands due to the very prevalence 
and dominance of the peasant commune.112  
The reason both Marx and Trotsky identified forms of divergence 
and differences similar to those found in the postcolonial literature was 
because both were sensitive – with some important limitations113 – to 
the intersection of History 1s and History 2s. As we shall see, it is 
through the idea of ‘combination’ that Trotsky’s theory provides a non-
stadial, multilinear understanding of development that explicitly denies 
essentialised and externally related dichotomies of pre-capitalist and 
capitalist. Similarly, we find in Marx an outright rejection of any ‘supra-
historical’ application of his categories in Capital. This was because 
‘events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historic 
surroundings led to totally different results’ and thus could not be 
explained ‘by the universal passport of a general historico-
philosophical theory’.114 The explicit (if still partial) disavowal of 
historicism (in Chakrabarty’s meaning of the term) in the writings of 
Trotsky and Marx should therefore alert us to the possibility that 
                                            
112 <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1881/zasulich/index.htm >. [hyperlink dead – 
MC] 
113 It is notable, for example, that neither Marx nor Trotsky integrated the analysis of the non-waged 
sphere into their analysis of capitalism in any systematic way. This has led some Marxists to see 
relations of patriarchy and white supremacy as mere ideological functions of the otherwise 
economic logic of capitalism. Such reductionism has been forcefully challenged by an array of 
authors working from the perspectives (for want of better terms) of critical gender and race theory, 
who have emphasised that both patriarchy and racism must be viewed as sets of class relations. 
See e.g. Delphy and Leonard 1984; Mills 1997; Alcoff and Fraser 2005; Federici 2012.  
114 <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1881/zasulich/index.htm> > 
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postcolonialism and Marxism need not be seen as mutually exclusive 
endeavours. 
 With this in mind, we suggest that uneven and combined 
development provides a theoretical approach that strengthens the 
broader aims of the postcolonial research programme. We make this 
suggestion because there remains a tension within postcolonialism 
that ultimately undermines its efforts in both fully subverting 
Eurocentrism and reinserting non-European agency into the history of 
capitalism. The tension is rooted in the parochial – dare we say 
‘provincial’ – scope of its critique; that is, their subject rarely extends 
beyond the particular experience of modernity in specific localities and, 
particularly, those experiences in the colonial modernities of the Global 
South. Thus, Chakrabarty notes that ‘Provincializing Europe is not a 
book about the region of the world we call “Europe”’,115 but is instead 
concerned with the generalisation of its forms and categories. 
Similarly, Chatterjee says: ‘[t]he universality of Western modernity ... 
is a product of its local conditions’, which is then subsequently 
‘transported to other place and times’.116 Consequently, both authors 
uncritically presuppose a discreet and hermetically-sealed European 
history in which modernity was uniquely created before being 
                                            
115 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 3. 
116 Chatterjee 2010, pp. 296–7. 
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subsequently expanded globally which is then the primary focus of 
their analyses.117 Such a view is an integral part of the myth of Europe 
as an exceptional, pristine and autonomous entity that happened to be 
especially well suited to the transition to, and spread of, capitalism.118 
Insofar as ‘the West is constituted as an imperial fetish, the imagined 
home of history’s victors’ and ‘the embodiment of their power’,119 many 
of the processes of developmental differentiation that created 
hierarchical imbalances between colonisers and colonised are 
occluded.120  
 
Guha’s ‘Dominance without Hegemony’ Reassessed  
 
In these ways, we find in postcolonial works a lack of any substantive 
engagement with the question of how capitalism emerged and 
developed in Europe in the first place. This is a – perhaps the – critical 
lacuna of postcolonial theory. Take, for example, Ranajit Guha’s 
classic analysis of Indian colonial modernity in Dominance without  
Hegemony and Chibber’s critique of it. Guha argues that capitalist 
modernity in India diverged from the experience of modernity in the 
                                            
117 Cooper 2005, p. 20. 
118 For two notable exceptions, see Bhambra 2007 and Shilliam 2009. 
119 Coronil 1996, pp. 77–8; see similarly, Lazarus 2002.  
120 Cf. Dirlik 1997; Lazarus 2011. 
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West, creating a distinct form of political rule – ‘dominance without 
hegemony’. This in turn forms the foundation for Guha’s key argument 
regarding ‘the failure of the Indian bourgeoisie to speak for the 
nation’121 – that it failed ‘to successfully integrate the culture of the 
disparate groups in Indian society into one all-embracing political 
community’. According to Chibber, such an argument is necessarily a 
contrastive claim requiring a comparative analysis of some sort.122 This 
is so because the ‘peculiarity’ of the Indian bourgeoisie constituting 
their ‘failure’ as such, Chibber argues, ‘simply cannot be understood 
without reference to some events which comprise the norm, or the 
standard, against which the peculiarities of colonialism can be 
understood’.123  
Chibber goes on to claim that the norm or standard from which 
to make this comparative contrast that Guha himself provides is that of 
the English and French bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries respectively.124 Chibber argues that ‘Guha’s 
historical sociology’125 of these events is mistaken, drawing as it does 
on a now ‘discredited historiography of the European revolutions’. As 
a consequence, Guha’s broader claims regarding the ‘putative gap 
                                            
121 Guha 1982, p. 5. 
122 Chibber 2013, pp. 33, 34.  
123 Chibber 2014a, p. 83. 
124 Chibber 2013, pp. 54–5.  
125 Chibber 2013, p. 102. 
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between the competency of Indian and western European capitalists 
… [is] largely fictional’.126 In substantiating these points, Chibber then 
offers his own synthesised, alternative historical sociology of these 
revolutions127 drawing on the latest (predominately ‘revisionist’) 
historiographical literatures in showing that neither the English nor 
French experiences could be defined as ‘“bourgeois revolutions” in the 
sense that Guha uses the term’.128  
Here we leave aside the substance of Chibber’s historical 
analysis and instead focus on the relevance of these claims for both 
the Subaltern project and Chibber’s critique of it. Chibber writes:  
 
At the heart of the Subalternist project, and of postcolonial 
theory more generally, stands the claim that there is a deep 
fault line separating Western capitalist nations from the 
postcolonial world. The importance of Ranajit Guha’s work is 
that it offers a historical sociology that seeks to explain how 
and why this fault line came into being.129 
 
                                            
126 Chibber 2014a, p. 82.  
127 See Chibber 2013, pp. 54–79. 
128 Chibber 2013, p. 55; For the reasons why the English and French revolutions cannot be 
considered ‘bourgeois revolutions’ in Guha’s sense (or, for that matter, in the classical Marxist 
sense), see pp. 76–9. We have provided an analysis of these revolutions that refutes many of 
Chibber’s historical arguments while drawing on a wider and more diverse range of perspectives 
in the historiographical literature than his own (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015, Chapter 6).  
129 Chibber 2013, p. 50. 
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The significance of Guha’s historical sociology of the early bourgeois 
revolutions in Europe for Chibber’s own critique of the Subaltern 
project is further brought out by Chibber when he writes that ‘if the 
wider arguments in the Subalternist oeuvre are to be assessed, the 
first requirement is an appraisal of the historical sociology on which 
they rest, as developed by Guha’.130 Indeed, Chibber’s key claim as to 
the originality of his critique of postcolonial theory is that it primarily 
focuses on the ‘Subalternists’ historical sociology, particularly their 
understanding of the East-West divergence – a subject crucial to their 
project, albeit one that has garnered very little attention’.131  
Chibber’s critique of Guha’s historical sociology is therefore 
fundamental to his broader criticisms of the Subaltern project and 
postcolonialism more generally. However, as a number of Chibber’s 
critics have argued, no such historical sociological account of the early 
bourgeois revolutions in Europe actually exists in Guha’s text.132 For 
the main aim of Guha’s text was, according to Chatterjee, ‘a critique of 
liberal historiography and the liberal ideology it represented and not 
[…] a historical sociology of bourgeois revolutions of Europe as 
                                            
130 Chibber 2013, p. 26.  
131 Chibber 2013, p. 22.  
132 See Chatterjee 2013; Seth 2014. By contrast, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has criticised Chibber 
for the audacity to even question such a ‘primary text’ as Guha’s Dominance without Hegemony, 
sardonically asking: ‘Would Professor Chibber correct Rosa Luxemburg and DD Kosambi? No, 
because he knows they are primary texts’ (Spivak 2014, p. 190) – a ridiculous claim that Chibber 
rightly takes to task as dogmatic nonsense in his reply (Chibber 2014b, pp. 619–22). 
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Chibber understands it to be’. What Guha sought to draw out in the 
first chapter of Dominance without Hegemony were two key claims 
made by liberal ideology and its historiographical articulations.133 The 
first regards the universalisation of capital highlighted in this 
hegemonic liberal narrative, and the second concerns their 
representations of the English and French revolutions in establishing 
bourgeois hegemony in the sense of the class’s ability to ‘speak for all 
of society’.134 Guha quotes Marx on this ‘achievement’ of the early 
bourgeois revolutions, which Chibber cites as evidence of Guha’s 
historical sociology of these events. However, Guha does so in order 
to argue that, if taken in isolation from Marx’s broader critique of 
capitalism, such claims would render Marx nearly ‘indistinguishable’ 
from many nineteenth-century liberal ideologues. Thus, nowhere does 
Guha actually ‘offer any propositions of his own that might be 
construed as a historical sociology’ of such revolutions.135  
Chatterjee’s interpretation of Guha’s work is broadly shared by 
Sanjay Seth (a former PhD student of Guha) who argues that he never 
provided the putative historical sociology Chibber ascribes to him. 
Instead, Guha’s central endeavour was to demonstrate how Britain’s 
colonial rule of India ‘did not and could not rest on the consent that it 
                                            
133 Chatterjee 2013, p. 69. 
134 Guha 1997, p. 134.  
135 Chatterjee 2013, p. 69.  
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claimed for itself at home’ and that the elites who took power after 
India’s independence could not either; that is, the Indian bourgeoisie 
could only achieve ‘dominance without hegemony’.136 The object of 
Guha’s critique was then the co-constitutive constructions of East and 
West by liberal historiography and its derivative discourses through a 
conception of European history as universal history.137  
What are we to make of such claims? Did Guha intend to offer a 
historical sociology of the English and French bourgeois revolutions as 
a ‘contrastive comparison’ to his claims about postcolonial India? And, 
if not, did he logically need to in substantiating his broader arguments? 
While Chibber and his critics’ contrasting interpretations of Guha 
are never quite as clear-cut as either of them makes them out to be, it 
would seem that Chatterjee and Seth’s reading is the more plausible 
one. In his reply to Chatterjee, Chibber chastises him for failing to 
provide ‘any textual evidence’ in support of his alternative 
interpretation of Guha or any engagement with the textual evidence 
that Chibber himself adduces in substantiating his claims. And Chibber 
is absolutely correct: Chatterjee does neither of these things. So what 
happens when we do engage with the textual evidence from Guha that 
Chibber provides?  
                                            
136 Seth 2014, p. 1218; emphasis ours.  
137 Roy 2015, pp. 3–4. 
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Let us look at a few of the most important pages of Dominance 
without Hegemony138 that Chibber singles out in challenging 
Chatterjee’s asserted counter-interpretation, where he claims Guha 
makes it ‘abundantly clear’ that he intends to offer a comparative 
‘norm’ or ‘standard’ (i.e. the European bourgeois revolutions) from 
which to draw out and critically examine the ‘peculiarities of 
colonialism’.139 Despite Chibber’s claim that these pages support his 
reading, Guha’s discussion in these pages appears to contradict 
Chibber’s interpretation. This is above all evinced in Guha’s explicit 
discussion of his particular method and object of critique where he 
makes clear that his methodological approach is an exclusively 
historiographical one that aims to reflect ‘on the character of colonialist 
historiography and show how it has sought to endow colonialism with 
a spurious hegemony denied it by history’.140 This point is reiterated on 
the next page, where Guha writes:  
 
Our approach to these problems [specifically, the failure of 
the Indian bourgeoisie to speak for the nation and thus 
achieve hegemony] picks its way through historiography, as 
the readers will notice no doubt from the signs displayed all 
                                            
138 Guha 1997, pp. xi–xiii, 3–5. 
139 Chibber 2014a, p. 83. 
140 Guha 1997, p. xii. 
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over the text and the arguments these refer to. We have taken 
this particular course not out of any conviction that this is the 
only possible way of asking questions about colonialism and 
the colonial state … But we have decided on the 
historiographical approach primarily because it helps us to 
combine the advantages of the classical theories [of political 
philosophy] with a consideration of history as writing. The 
importance of the latter for our problematic is hard to 
exaggerate. For at a certain level the question of power in 
colonial South Asia or anywhere else in a land under foreign 
occupation can be phrased succinctly as ‘Who writes the 
history of the subjugated people?’.141  
 
It appears, then, that Guha’s work is intended as an immanent critique 
of liberal ideology – in both colonial and postcolonial forms – and its 
corresponding hegemonic historiographical tendencies represented by 
rival colonial and nationalist historians in India. As such, Guha’s critical 
‘historiographical approach’ operates at the purely discursive or 
narrative-centred level. It seeks to demonstrate that the failure of the 
                                            
141Guha 1997, p. xiii; emphasis ours. Further in regard to the importance of this historiographical 
approach, Guha writes: ‘Our attempt to inform this study of colonialism by the pathos of a purloined 
past is therefore not so much a matter of professional convenience as a strategy to situate the 
writing of a conquered people’s history by conquerors at the very heart of the question of one 
nation’s oppression by another’ (Guha 1997, p. xiv).  
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British bourgeoisie in ruling colonial India and their Indian counterparts 
after independence ‘to measure up to the heroism of the European 
bourgeoisie in its period of ascendancy’142 is, for Guha, the standard 
or norm from which to critique it as presented by liberal ideologues and 
their historiographical representations. In other words, the ‘contrastive 
comparison’ that Guha is making is one internal to liberal ideology and 
its historiographical representations of European history.  
From this perspective, Guha takes aim at the shared presumption 
of a ‘unitary political domain’ (‘Civil Society = Nation = State’) – 
derivative of the hegemonic form of rule that Britain claimed for itself 
at home – that colonial and nationalist historiographies read into the 
Indian past.143 In contradistinction to this ‘enigma’ common to ‘both of 
those rival ideologies’ which Guha takes as his ‘point of departure’, he 
argues that the ‘colonial state in South Asia was very unlike and indeed 
fundamentally different from the metropolitan bourgeois state which 
had sired it’.144 Guha is therefore essentially holding up the British 
colonial and Indian bourgeoisie and critiquing them in the mirror of their 
own ideological and historiographical constructions. In his own words: 
 
                                            
142 Guha 1997, p. 5. 
143 Guha 1997, pp. xi–xii. 
144 Guha 1997, p. xii. 
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we present our views on the structure of dominance in 
colonial India and historiography's relation to it as a critique 
of our own approach to the Indian past and our own 
performance in writing about it. The purpose of this work is, 
therefore, simply to stimulate a degree of self-criticism within 
the practice of Indian historiography. What calls for such self-
criticism is our complicity with colonialist historiography.145 
 
Guha seems content not to offer any substantive historical sociology 
of these events himself. Instead, Guha only provides an exposition of 
different elite-based historiographical accounts of the Indian colonial 
and postcolonial state. But significantly, before doing so, he turns to a 
discussion of the liberal ideological and historiographical critique of 
feudalism in the era of its demise and the ascendancy of the 
bourgeoisie.146 What he is seeking to elucidate here is where an 
‘uncompromising critique’ of a ruling order (e.g. feudalism, capitalism, 
etc.) might come from. Guha answers: ‘[f]rom outside the universe of 
dominance which provides the critique with its object, indeed, from 
another and historically antagonistic universe’.147 He then raises a 
question of ‘fundamental importance’ to his analysis: where ‘does the 
                                            
145 Guha 1997, p. 96. 
146 Guha 1997, pp. 11–13.  
147 Guha 1997, p. 11. 
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critique of liberalism itself come from?’. Again, the answer is that it 
comes from ‘an ideology that is antagonistic towards the dominant 
culture and declares war on it even before the class for which it speaks 
comes to rule’, an ideological critique that organically ‘arises from the 
real contradictions of capitalism and anticipates its dissolution’.148 
Guha then lays out one such contradiction – the universalising 
tendency of capital – that ‘serves as a basis for the critique of a 
bourgeois culture in dominance’. He argues that Marx’s 
conceptualisation of capital’s universalising tendency is  
 
not about expansion alone, but about an expansion 
predicated firmly and inevitably on limitations capital can 
never overcome; not simply about a project powered by the 
possibility of infinite development, but a project predicated on 
the certainty of its failure to realize itself.149  
 
Marx’s critique of capital’s universalising drive as a necessarily limited 
and incomplete forms the launching-pad for Guha’s subsequent 
analysis. But, as should be clear, Guha’s argument throughout 
remains an expository one; it operates at the discursive level 
                                            
148 Guha 1997, p. 13.  
149 Guha 1997, p. 15. 
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examining different hegemonic and counter-hegemonic ideologies, 
historiographical representations, and critiques.  
Having established this ideological and historiographical context 
and the nature of his critique in the preface and opening pages of the 
book, Guha goes on to make various comparative contrasts between 
the European and Indian bourgeoisie and their political orders without 
actually having to make any substantive historical sociological claims 
of his own. On this interpretation, it then makes sense that Guha’s 
discussion of the English and French revolutions would take the form 
of ‘highly compressed statements’ that are continually ‘presented in 
the form of an assertion, not an argument’150 for which Guha provides 
no supporting references to any contemporary historical works or wider 
body of historiographical literature. And why should he if the aim of the 
study was an internal critique of liberal ideological narratives and 
historiographies? The normative benchmark for Guha’s critique of 
liberal historiography is their own self-representations of the role of the 
bourgeoisie in Europe and India and the types of political orders they 
produced. It is then the ‘real’ contradiction inhering in capital’s own 
universalising tendency which constitutes the material conditions from 
                                            
150 Chibber 2013, p. 54. 
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which such an ideological critique – indeed, Marx’s critique – could 
emerge.151  
Hence, the quotations Chibber produces from Guha to credit him 
with a ‘historical sociology’ of the early bourgeois revolutions turn out 
to be – when read in this broader context and structure of Guha’s work 
– Guha’s critical exposition of other writers’ analyses (both liberals and 
Marx). This reading also makes sense when Guha speaks of the 
‘heroism of the European bourgeoisie in its period of ascendancy’ as 
it seems that Guha is here being deliberatively ironic in using the very 
characterisation of the European bourgeoisie (‘heroism’) as presented 
by their liberal ideologues and corresponding historiographies.  
 
The Lacuna of Postcolonial Theory  
 
Though the historical sociology that Chibber finds in Guha does not 
appear to exist, one could certainly forgive him for thinking it did. For 
Chibber’s other key point regarding the logical necessity of Guha 
providing some historical ‘contrastive comparison’ in understanding 
the ‘peculiarities’ of the colonial and postcolonial Indian state and its 
                                            
151 As Guha reiterates (Guha 1997, p. 20): ‘the critique of historiography should begin by 
questioning the universalist assumptions of liberal ideology and the attribution of hegemony taken 
for granted in colonialist and nationalist interpretations of the Indian past. It must begin, in short, 
by situating itself outside the universe of liberal discourse’. 
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bourgeois representatives remains valid. Chibber’s critique of the 
‘Subalternist oeuvre’ that rests on Guha’s work is in this regard broadly 
correct; though not quite in the way Chibber intended. That is to say, 
the lack of any historical sociological account of the ascendancy of 
bourgeois dominance and the origins of capitalism in Europe more 
generally in the Subalternist oeuvre limits their ability to fully transcend 
the Eurocentric modes of analysis they so forcefully critique. It is this 
absence that constitutes the fundamental shortcoming of the Subaltern 
project and postcolonial studies as a whole. It unintentionally leads 
them to present a highly idealised picture of European development as 
endogenously giving birth to capitalist modernity from where it 
subsequently spread outward that does not accord with the historical 
evidence. The West is thereby endowed with hyper-fetishised agential 
powers – the sole and sovereign author of their own history.152 
Despite acknowledging the significance of capitalism as a force 
of history, postcolonialism’s lack of engagement with the historical 
origins of capitalism lends itself to a conception of capitalism that is 
‘decidedly singular and decidedly European’.153 This in turn runs the 
risk of reproducing ‘the Orientalist trope that the specificities of 
“Oriental” states and societies are subordinate to the all-encompassing 
                                            
152 Coronil 1996; Lazarus 2002. 
153 Cooper 2005, p. 20. 
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and irreducible categorisation of their being Oriental’.154 The emphasis 
on such ‘specificity’, moreover, tends to overlook the very processes 
of developmental differentiation that created hierarchical imbalances 
between colonisers and colonised in the first place.155 So, while 
additional empirical frameworks gleaned from the postcolonial 
approach have decentred many Eurocentric presuppositions, these 
theoretical presuppositions have remained intact and at worst actively 
replicated.156  
To modify Frederick Cooper’s call to arms: in order to truly 
‘provincialise’ Europe one must dissect European history itself, and 
there is no more central myth to be dissected than that of narrating 
European history around the history of capitalism.157 As Kamran Matin 
argues, such a task ultimately requires ‘a general social theory, and not 
just a theory of modernity’, one ‘that goes beyond a mere 
phenomenology of capital’s expansion and comprehends capital itself 
as a product of the interactive multiplicity of the social’.158 This demands 
a genuinely ‘internationalist historiography’159 and theorisation of 
capitalism’s emergence and reproduction; one that could ‘distinguish 
between the inflated, utopian self-presentation of capital as abstract 
                                            
154 Bryce 2013, p. 100.  
155 Cf. Dirlik 1997; Lazarus 2011. 
156 Halperin 2006, p. 43. 
157 Cooper 2005, p. 22. 
158 Matin 2013, p. 364. 
159 Banaji 2010, p. 253. [now inserted into bibliography – MC] 
59 | P a g e  
 
and homogenous and the contradictions internal to historical capitalism 
that produce a global, differentiated, and hierarchical space-time’.160 
For the very conditions giving rise to capitalist social relations within 
Europe over the longue durée were often rooted within and emanating 
from non-Western sources and agents.161  
Such an ‘internationalist’ perspective is, we argue, provided by 
the theory of uneven and combined development. By positing the 
multilinear character of development as its ‘most general law’,162 
uneven development provides a necessary corrective to any 
ontologically singular conception of society163 and associated unilinear 
conceptions of history that underpin Eurocentric accounts. By positing 
the intrinsically interactive character of this multiplicity, combined 
development in turn challenges the methodological internalism of 
Eurocentric approaches while the very concept of combination denotes 
that there has never existed any pure or normative model of 
development.164 As such, the theory rejects Eurocentrism’s reified 
conceptualisation of the universal as an a priori property of an 
                                            
160 Goswami 2004, p. 40.  
161 See Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015. 
162 Trotsky 2008. 
163 That is to say, the derivation of societal multiplicity (‘the international’) from the properties of a 
unitary social form (for example, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, etc.). Consequently, while 
‘international’ (or intersocietal) phenomena may be permitted all kinds of contingent empirical 
significance in a given analysis, they do not factor into the theorisation of what constitutes a society 
as such. See Rosenberg 2006. This problem of ontological singularity is reproduced by Chibber in 
his critique of postcolonialism and elsewhere: see especially, Chibber 2011.   
164 See Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015.  
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immanently conceived homogeneous entity. For the ‘historical reality’ 
of uneven and combined development165 is a ‘universally operational 
causal context’ whose ontological fabric is simultaneously generative 
of and shaped by intersocietal alterity.166 This is an approach that 
conceptualises the specificities of any given society as representing ‘an 
original combination of the basic features of the world process’ – a 
‘social amalgam combining the local and general’ that is ‘nothing else 
but the most general product of the unevenness of historical 
development, its summary result, so to say’.167 It thereby allows for a 
conception of the universal that is amenable to and constituted by 
difference itself.168  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have sought to reassess the potential merits and 
pitfalls of postcolonial theory – and, in particular, the Subaltern project 
– through the prism of Vivek Chibber’s Marxist-inspired critique of it. In 
so doing, we have demonstrated some of the problems with Chibber’s 
                                            
165 Trotsky 1972, p. 116. 
166 Matin 2013, p. 368. 
167 Trotsky 1962, p. 23; Trotsky 1969, p. 56; Trotsky 1962, p. 24. 
168 Cf. Matin 2013. 
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critique which, we argue, must be overcome in order to properly 
appreciate both the strengths and weaknesses of the postcolonial 
critique of Eurocentrism, opening the way for new and more 
constructive engagements between Marxism and postcolonialism. As 
we have shown, Leon Trotsky’s idea of uneven and combined 
development provides one potentially fruitful avenue of engagement 
and critique.169 This is a concept that has undergone an 
unprecedented intellectual revival over the last two decades, 
particularly in the field of International Relations and historical 
sociology, where scholars have sought to further draw out the 
implications of uneven and combined development in offering a non-
Eurocentric social theory of ‘the international’.170  
For implicit in Trotsky’s idea was a reconceptualisation of all 
development as necessarily interactive and multilinear. This 
essentially redefined the very concept and logic of development itself. 
Whereas the classical sociological tradition conceptualised society as 
a singular abstraction,171 Trotsky’s conception of development was 
inscribed with a ‘more-than-one’ ontological premise.172 This then 
cleared the way for an entirely ‘new understanding of human history’173 
                                            
169 See further, Murphet 2014; Nilsen 2015; Lazarus 2016. 
170 For a list of some of these contributions, see 
<http://www.unevenandcombineddevelopment.wordpress.com/writings/>. 
171 Cf. Tenbruck 1994; Rosenberg 2006.  
172 Rosenberg 2013, pp. 581–3. 
173 Löwy 1981, p. 87. 
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breaking with any Eurocentric, ‘historicist mode of thinking’, as 
Chakrabarty terms it, that visualises development as ‘the secular, 
empty, and homogenous time of history’.174  
In its appreciation of societal multiplicity and difference, uneven 
and combined development provides a way of capturing the non-
linearity of development that is so central to displacing Eurocentric 
accounts. As such, it shares many affinities with postcolonial 
approaches. In particular, uneven and combined development 
provides a particularly fertile framework through which the sort of 
interconnections between History 1s and History 2s emphasised by 
Chakrabarty might be identified, explored and explained. However, 
beyond Chakrabarty and the Subaltern project, the advantage of 
uneven and combined development lies precisely in its broader 
temporal scope. This uniquely positions it as a framework through 
which we may reconstitute the master categories of Eurocentrism – 
such as capitalism and modernity – on the very terrain they were 
purportedly generated: that of Europe.175 
A Marxist critique of postcolonial theory should not simply 
dismiss the problematic of sociohistorical difference postcolonial 
scholars have raised and the implications this holds in furnishing a 
                                            
174 Chakrabarty 2008, p. 23, paraphrasing Walter Benjamin.  
175 See Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015 and 2016. 
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genuinely non-Eurocentric theory of history. For the Marxist tradition 
provides invaluable resources in incorporating the strengths of the 
postcolonial critique of Eurocentrism, whilst transcending its 
limitations. 
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